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Article 
The Rise of National Security Secrets 
SUDHA SETTY 
Professor Aziz Rana urges a broad and populist reconsideration of the 
idea that the administration and military are best positioned to make 
decisions about national security issues.  This Article calls for a rethinking 
of national security secrecy as well.  The centralization of security 
decision-making power in the early Cold War era fostered a culture of 
government secrecy, with Congress and the judiciary enabling the rise of 
national security secrecy out of fear that they were ill-equipped to make 
security-related decisions, and public fear of internal and international 
security threats trumping concerns about legitimacy or democratic 
accountability.  This culture of secrecy has reinforced and legitimated 
governmental secrecy in current times.  The ongoing harms include a long-
term distortion to the rule of law, prevention of redress for individual 
litigants harmed by the national security state, a detriment to perceptions 
of governmental legitimacy, and a severe reduction in transparency and 
accountability. 
Other democratic nations facing severe security threats have found a 
more just and humane balance between the legitimate need for secrecy and 
the democratic demand for information concerning actions taken in the 
name of our national security, which demonstrates that the current U.S. 
information-sharing paradigm is not necessarily the default.  Such 
evidence provides a strong basis for reconsidering the current security 
structures in the United States and re-engaging the public in gaining 
greater access to information that the government relies upon in making 
security policy.  Professor Rana’s call for a re-thinking of the security 
roles of government actors and of the public provides an important 
starting point for discourse around remediating imbalances in information 
and decision-making power to better balance and strengthen our 
democracy.
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The Rise of National Security Secrets 
SUDHA SETTY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Professor Aziz Rana, in his thought-provoking article, Who Decides on 
Security?, traces the history of Congress and the judiciary abdicating their 
proper role in deciding security matters back to the New Deal and World 
War II eras—which saw the rise of security expertise and security-related 
information being inculcated solely in the executive branch and 
administrative departments.1  Rana argues that this new structural 
arrangement constituted a significant shift in the public understanding of 
what “security” meant and how the different branches of government ought 
to be involved in understanding, maintaining, and protecting it.2 
Part II of this Article argues that the professionalization of security 
during World War II and the early Cold War era enabled not only the 
exclusivity of military decision-making in the executive branch and 
administration, but also subverted the fundamental democratic principle 
that the public, the courts, and Congress have the right to information 
about security decision-making.  This shift in the information paradigm 
was cemented during the early Cold War years and has reinforced 
governmental secrecy in current times.  Courts now rely on their own 
precedent over several decades to defer extensively to executive branch 
determinations that secrecy must surround national security initiatives, 
such as extraordinary rendition and targeted killing, even when the end 
result undermines the judiciary’s role in protecting fundamental rights.3  In 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.  J.D. Columbia Law 
School, A.B. Stanford University.  I owe thanks to Matthew H. Charity, Wadie E. Said, and Stephen J. 
Schulhofer for discussing the ideas in this Article with me; to Renee Rastorfer and Jennifer Stearns for 
valuable research assistance; and to James T. Cole and the board of the Connecticut Law Review for 
inviting me to write this Article. 
1 See Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN L. REV. 1417, 1455–58 (2012) (discussing 
the professionalization of the military in the 1930s and 1940s). 
2 See id. at 53 (focusing on a limited judicial review of executive war-making decisions that 
enabled and empowered serious governmental abuse of liberties (citing Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding the military’s decision to intern Japanese Americans and U.S. 
residents of Japanese origin during World War II and emphasizing the need to defer to military 
decision-making in wartime); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104 (1943) (upholding the 
military authority to impose a wartime curfew on Japanese Americans and U.S. residents of Japanese 
origin)). 
3 This dynamic has been well-documented elsewhere.  E.g., Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The 
Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 168 (2006) 
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such cases, courts often express misgivings about their (in)ability to take 
on their traditional counter-majoritarian role, but profess a lack of 
understanding to question executive branch assertions and override claims 
of national security, even where executive branch overreaching is 
remediable only through judicial action.4  Likewise, Congress continues its 
decades-old pattern of actively ceding authority to the executive branch 
even when it has the constitutional authority to demand more information 
or, as Professor Rana encourages, play a greater role in security-related 
decision-making.5 
Part III posits that this state of affairs is not necessarily the default.  
Examples from other democratic nations in which security has been a 
challenge illustrate that it is feasible and structurally desirable for the 
judiciary to be fully engaged on security-related issues and for legislatures 
to provide meaningful checks on executive overreaching. 
This Article concludes that such evidence provides a strong basis for 
reconsidering the current security structures in the United States and re-
engaging the public in gaining greater access to information that the 
government relies upon in making security policy.  In the end, Professor 
Rana’s call for a re-thinking of the security roles of government actors and 
of the public provides a starting point for discourse around creating 
genuine structural change to remediate the imbalances in information and 
decision-making power among the branches of government and with 
regard to the public as well. 
II.  THE RISE OF SECRECY 
As the professionalization of military decision-making took hold by 
the mid-twentieth century and Congress, the judiciary, and the public were 
largely seen as observers to security-related policy-making, it was a logical 
next step and beneficial to the administration to exclude the public and 
other branches of government from having access to the information 
underlying the decision-making.  Thus, it is unsurprising that security-
related secrecy intensified in the late 1940s and onward as the Cold War 
developed and then anchored security discourse. 
A.  Cold War Secrecy 
The early Cold War period represented a crucial turning point in 
public, judicial, and congressional access to national security-related 
                                                                                                                          
(arguing that the judiciary is constitutionally and structurally obligated to assess executive branch 
claims of national security secrecy less deferentially). 
4 Id. at 168–69. 
5 See Rana, supra note 1, at 1421 (explaining that even when Congress does intervene the effect 
of the legislation increases executive power). 
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information.6  Several interrelated dynamics led to the lack of information-
sharing: first, the Cold War represented a shift in the U.S. security model 
where reliance on professional intelligence-gathering and access to 
information became central to perceptions of U.S. military success.7  
Second, the Cold War represented a challenge to the United States in terms 
of foreign affairs and the government’s ability to extend the U.S. 
geopolitical sphere of influence.8  As such, the role of the executive as the 
natural decision-maker in matters involving foreign policy and foreign 
affairs enabled the consolidation of decision-making power in the 
executive branch and the military.9  Third, much of the domestic rhetoric 
surrounding the Cold War included a deep unease that Soviet interests had 
permeated American society such that the loyalty of citizens was 
questionable.10  Once this concern took root, the argument that information 
                                                                                                                          
6 See Wallace Parks, Secrecy and the Public Interest in Military Affairs, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
23, 23 (1957) (noting the shift in access to national security-related information following World War 
II). 
7 See id. (noting the importance of not disclosing information unnecessarily given that “the 
U.S.S.R. maintains an extensive and efficient world-wide intelligence apparatus”).  Despite the need 
for some secrecy for intelligence-gathering operations, the potential negative implications of long-term 
military secrecy were also clear to contemporary scholars.  See id. at 23–24.  Parks argued that the lack 
of information forthcoming from the military establishment in the post-World War II era eroded the 
fundamental democratic principle of open government and ultimately would prove detrimental to 
national security interests.  Id. at 26. 
8 In this respect, some contemporary commentators worried that too much secrecy could 
undermine public support for necessary foreign policy measures because of a false public sense of 
security or because misleading information could take root in the public mind in the absence of reliable 
information forthcoming from the military establishment.  See Parks, supra note 6, at 31.  Other 
commentators expressed concern that too much secrecy would undermine the democratic freedoms that 
differentiated the United States from communist nations.  See Leo Albert Huard, The Status of National 
Internal Security During 1955, 44 GEO. L.J. 179, 179–80 (1956) (“The excrescence of international 
communism and the constant presence of total war, hot or cold, has made the keeping of national 
secrets an absolute necessity.  We must show the world that democracy can be secure without silencing 
its citizens or suppressing the free expression of their political thought.”). 
9 Early Cold War era commentators opined that the professionalization of the military 
establishment in the World War I era largely undermined the constitutional structure of civilian control 
over the military, and that this restructuring of constitutional power was being cemented by the lack of 
information being made available outside of the executive branch in the post-World War II era.  See, 
e.g., Parks, supra note 6, at 27–29.  New Deal era cases made clear that the shift in perception of 
information access preceded World War II.  For example, the Court’s perception of comparative 
congressional-executive information access regarding military and foreign affairs matters in Curtiss-
Wright validates Congress’s decision to cede some of its own legislative power to enable greater 
latitude for executive decision-making with regard to foreign affairs.  See United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–21 (1936) (noting that the President has access to 
“confidential sources of information” and the ability to act on sensitive and confidential matters in a 
way that Congress cannot). 
10 Certainly the activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee, the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, and other congressional bodies reflect this concern in the early Cold 
War era.  ELEANOR BONTECOU, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM 171 (1957); see also 
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY 
102 (1953) (noting that significant evidence was given that various congressional committees had been 
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access over security-related information must be curtailed to prevent injury 
to national security became compelling to courts and to Congress despite 
concerns that the military could use secrecy as a tool to avoid 
congressional oversight and public or judicial accountability.11 
Congress was quite willing to cede to the executive and military both 
the authority to make national security decisions and to control access to 
national security-related information.  In a series of statutes passed in the 
early Cold War period, Congress enabled administrative control of the 
collection and classification process for secret information.12  When public 
resistance to this enabling occurred, Congress made some attempts to 
regain public trust.  For example, Congress established the Commission on 
Government Security (“the Wright Commission”) in 1955,13 with the 
purpose of conducting active oversight of security matters.  In addition to 
structuring the Wright Commission to include bipartisan representatives 
and private citizens selected by both houses of Congress and the 
President,14 the Wright Commission had a broad mandate to “study and 
investigate the entire Government security program, including . . . national 
defense secrets.”15 
Such attempts at oversight would appear to alleviate contemporary 
concerns about a security state in which relevant information is kept secret 
within the executive and military.  Yet the Wright Commission’s only 
                                                                                                                          
infiltrated, and recognizing the “vast powers which hidden Communists could exercise from such a 
vantage point”).  The executive branch also reacted strongly to fears of Communist infiltration.  See 
Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953) (supplanting E.O. 9835 and mandating 
federal agencies to investigate whether employees posed a security risk to the nation); Exec. Order No. 
9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947) (setting forth a broad mandate for the Federal Employee 
Loyalty Program); see also Huard, supra note 8, at 180 (“We must take steps to remove disloyal 
persons from positions where national secrets are available to them. . . . [S]ome allege, that the balance 
between preservation of our form of government and protection of individual rights has been upset . . . . 
Some of this criticism can be dismissed as communist-inspired.”). 
11 See Parks, supra note 6, at 30 (noting a serious concern with “the implications of the 
withholding of information on the American institutions of civil-military relations with primary 
emphasis on the informational needs of the non-governmental community and the Congress”). 
12 E.g., Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, §§ 1006–13 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 831–35 (2006)) (providing limitations and guidelines on who has access to classified information at 
the National Security Agency); Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, id. § 403g (holding the 
Director of National Intelligence accountable for safeguarding intelligence information from 
disclosure); National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 435 (governing the process of classifying 
information and accessing classified information); id. § 403-5d (limiting the dissemination of 
privileged information); id. § 404g (disallowing intelligence from being shared with the United 
Nations); id. § 421 (punishing individuals who reveal the identity of undercover agents and classified 
information); id. § 432 (allowing operational files of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to 
not be disclosed or viewed by the public). 
13 Pub. L. 304, 69 Stat. 595, 595 (1955); see also Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Foreword to REPORT 
OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY XXXIII (1997). 
14 See Huard, supra note 8, at 205. 
15 Pub. L. 304, § 6, 69 Stat. at 596. 
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legislative proposals were to amend criminal statutes to enable prosecution 
of those who made classified information public and to allow for evidence 
of subversion obtained through wiretaps authorized by the Attorney 
General to be admissible.16  Thus, the legacy of the Wright Commission in 
terms of its impact on congressional oversight of military decision-making 
was to encourage making legislative allowances for increasing and 
protecting secrecy against the constitutional interests of free expression 
and privacy.17 
Likewise, the judiciary evinced little interest in taking an active 
oversight role regarding security-related secrecy.  A seminal case 
illustrating the judicial-political dynamic in the early Cold War era is 
United States v. Reynolds,18 which established the U.S. standard for 
evaluating executive branch and military claims of the state secrets 
privilege and helped cement the idea that national security information is 
often too sensitive to be disclosed to even the courts.19  In Reynolds, the 
widows of three civilians killed in the 1948 crash of a military plane during 
a test flight sought compensation in a wrongful death suit against the 
government.20 The government asserted the state secrets privilege21 in 
                                                                                                                          
16 COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY, supra note 10, at 629; see also Rana, supra note 1, 
at 1421 (observing the same congressional enabling of executive power at different times in U.S. 
history). 
17 Although the legislative proposals of the Wright Commission were not immediately adopted, 
four decades later Senator Patrick Moynihan reflected on the work of the Wright Commission: 
In retrospect, the importance of the Wright Commission was not what it 
proposed, but that its proposals were never seriously considered.  It had become 
clear to the nation . . . that even in a time of Cold War, the United States 
Government must rest, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, on “the 
consent of the governed.”  And there can be no meaningful consent where those 
who are governed do not know to what they are consenting. 
Moynihan, supra note 13, at XXXIII–XXXIV (citing DAVID WISE & THOMAS B. ROSS, THE INVISIBLE 
GOVERNMENT 6 (1964)) (internal quotations omitted). 
18 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
19 Id. at 6–7, 10.  For a fuller discussion of the state secrets privilege and the role of Reynolds, see 
William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 90 
(2005) (arguing that the courts should clarify the privilege to enhance these protections against 
executive branch overreaching); see also Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on 
the State Secrets Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 201, 206–08 (2009) (discussing the deferential judicial 
approach to invocations of the state secrets privilege). 
20 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2–3. 
21 The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege enabling the government to 
prevent disclosure of sensitive state information during litigation.  A court upholding a claim of 
privilege has the power to shape the litigation according to the perceived degree of harm, with 
consequences ranging from the denial of a discovery request for a document to the dismissal of a suit.  
See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissing 
suit seeking recovery for rendition and torture); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 
2007) (same). 
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response to a document request by plaintiffs for the flight accident report.22 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in evaluating whether the flight accident 
report ought to remain secret and whether the case could go forward 
without the report, reasoned that although “[j]udicial control over the 
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive 
officers,”23 the privilege required deference on the part of the judiciary and, 
in this case, required secrecy over the information in question.24  Notably, 
although the standard established by the Reynolds Court specifically 
allowed for the reviewing court to examine the underlying documents in 
camera as a means of evaluating the sufficiency of the privilege claim, the 
Court decided that the trial court did not need to do so.  This aspect of the 
Court’s holding turned on its perception that “this is a time of vigorous 
preparation for national defense,”25 thereby making clear that it agreed 
with the executive assertion that secrecy is an integral part of effective 
national security.  Under this framework of security decision-making, to 
encourage judicial access to information—even for in camera review—
would unacceptably compromise security interests.26  The loss suffered by 
the widows bringing the suit against the government, although 
acknowledged by the Court, was ultimately unpersuasive for the purpose 
of even having the trial court examine the underlying accident report. 
Had the Court allowed the trial court to examine the flight accident 
report, the trial court would have been able to take into account the 
                                                                                                                          
22 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3–4.  The government also cited to Air Force Regulation No. 62-7(5)(b), 
which precluded disclosure of such reports outside the authorized chain of command without the 
approval of the Secretary of the Air Force.  Id. at 3–4 & n.4. 
23 Id. at 9–10. 
24 Id. at 6–7.  The Reynolds Court created a deferential framework for evaluating claims of 
privilege that involves, among other requirements, that the reviewing court uphold the claim of 
privilege if a “reasonable danger” to national security is likely.  Id. at 10. 
25 Id. at 10–11. 
26 Notably, Justice Frankfurter was among the dissenting justices in Reynolds.  Although the 
dissenting justices chose not to write a separate opinion, they cited to the Third Circuit’s opinion in the 
litigation as reflective of the dissenting justices’ thinking on the subject.  Id. at 12 (Black, J., 
dissenting).  The Third Circuit held that the flight accident report should be examined and that the 
scope of the state secrets privilege ought to be construed narrowly so as to allow the litigation to 
proceed.  Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 998 (3d Cir. 1951).  Judge Maris offered his view of 
the philosophical dangers of secrecy in a democracy:  
We need to recall in this connection the words of Edward Livingston: “No 
nation ever yet found any inconvenience from too close an inspection into the 
conduct of its officers, but many have been brought to ruin, and reduced to 
slavery, by suffering gradual imposition and abuses, which were imperceptible, 
only because the means of publicity had not been secured.”  And it was Patrick 
Henry who said that “to cover with the veil of secrecy the common routine of 
business, is an abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man and every friend 
to his country.[”] 
Id. at 995 (internal citations omitted). 
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information that had become public when the report was declassified in the 
1990s:27 the military secrets claimed by the government did not exist, but 
there was evidence that the plane’s lack of standard safeguards may have 
contributed to its crash—evidence of the negligence alleged in the widows’ 
lawsuit from the 1950s.28 
Other secrecy-related cases from the early Cold War period offer a mix 
of perspectives from the judiciary on investigating government claims of 
national security secrecy.  In the criminal context, courts expressed some 
deference to executive branch secrecy designations,29 but maintained 
oversight by forcing the government to confront the constitutional 
problems arising from attempts to keep secret information that was relied 
upon to prosecute a suspect.30  In the civil context, the judiciary was more 
deferential to claims of secrecy,31 although courts were willing to check 
executive secrecy when Congress authorized the judiciary to take a more 
active role in dealing with secret information.32 
The 1950s security-related congressional activity, along with Reynolds 
and other contemporary cases, illustrates the early Cold War reality that the 
public,33 the judiciary, and Congress had diminished access to the 
information underlying security decision-making.34  The end result of 
                                                                                                                          
27 LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND 
THE REYNOLDS CASE 165–66 (2006). 
28 Id. at 181–82.  For an in-depth account of the Reynolds case, see generally id. (analyzing the 
case and contextualizing it by assessing its effect on the United States); see also Patrick Radden Keefe, 
State Secrets: A Government Misstep in a Wiretapping Case, NEW YORKER, Apr. 28, 2008, at 28 
(describing the frequency with which state secrets, as outlined in Reynolds, are invoked); cf. Herring v. 
United States, 424 F.3d 384, 392 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the United States did not commit a fraud 
on the court in its representations during the Reynolds litigation). 
29 See United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436, 438 (E.D. Wa. 1944) (“The determination of 
what steps are necessary in time of war for the protection of national security lies exclusively with the 
military and is not subject to court review.”) (quoting United States v. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 81, 93 
(1943)). 
30 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 670–72 (1957) (opining that the limit of national 
security secrecy was reached when the ability to mount a criminal defense was significantly 
compromised by defendant’s lack of access to sensitive but relevant information); United States v. 
Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that the prosecution must decide whether to drop its 
case or reveal state secrets relevant to the defense). 
31 See United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 468–69 (1951) (upholding the 
authority of the Attorney General to promulgate regulations prohibiting disclosure of Justice 
Department information, even in response to subpoenas issued in habeas corpus proceedings). 
32 See Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43–44 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that Congress had 
authorized courts to hold in camera sessions to try cases under the Invention Secrecy Act, even where 
state secrets were at issue). 
33 Congress acted to formalize secrecy protections to control private information as well.  See 
Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 93 (2010) (describing the 
government role in secrecy as extending into the private sector in the 1950s). 
34 See Arthur S. Miller, The Constitutional Law of the “Security State,” 10 STAN. L. REV. 620, 
639 (1958) (noting that “[b]oth the judiciary and the legislature have waned in their positions of 
relative power”). 
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Reynolds, where overreaching and misstatements by the military were 
unchecked by a reluctant judiciary, illustrates early costs of the post-World 
War II rise of secrecy, which were largely cemented in the ensuing 
decades.35 
B.  Post-9/11 Secrecy 
In the post-9/11 era, the same objections to national security secrecy—
relating to government accountability, transparency, and the rule of law—
that were raised in the early Cold War era have been resurrected.36  Yet in a 
variety of contexts, from the government’s numerous invocations of the 
state secrets privilege,37 to a suit challenging the government’s targeted 
killing program,38 to freedom of information requests regarding the 
implementation of post-9/11 security measures,39 government secrecy 
claims have prevailed consistently over principles of accountability, 
transparency, and open government. 
Although plaintiffs have achieved some degree of victory in habeas 
corpus cases claiming access to the judicial system to contest detentions,40 
                                                                                                                          
35 See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1292–93 (2007) (discussing several cases during the 1970s in which the state 
secrets privilege was invoked); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Secrecy and Democracy: Who Controls 
Information in the National Security State? 14–15 (N.Y.U. Sch. of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-53, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1661964 (discussing self-serving motivations for 
the administration to keep information secret). 
36 See, e.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2003) (describing the parallels between post-9/11 security measures 
and the McCarthy era). 
37 See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 19, at 89 (describing the Bush administration’s invocation of 
the state secrets privilege in the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks as unprecedentedly high). 
38 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 54 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing, based on standing 
grounds and concerns about the government’s need for secrecy with regard to its targeted killing 
program, the suit of Nasser Al-Aulaqi to enjoin the U.S. government from keeping his son, U.S. citizen 
Anwar Al-Aulaqi, on its targeted killing list). 
39 See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 926–27 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001), and Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 
518, 530 (1988) with regard to the need for deference) (denying Freedom of Information Act requests 
for the names of immigrants detained in post-9/11 law enforcement sweeps and noting that it is “well-
established that the judiciary owes some measure of deference to the executive in cases implicating 
national security, a uniquely executive purview”); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 34–35 (D.D.C. 2003) (denying freedom of information requests regarding the 
implementation of surveillance mechanisms under the USA PATRIOT Act).  In these cases, the 
government has often successfully invoked a mosaic theory to claim that seemingly innocuous 
information is still too sensitive to allow for disclosure to the public.  See Jameel Jaffer, The Mosaic 
Theory, 77 SOC. RES. 873, 873 (2010). 
40 Decisions like Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796–98 (2008) (discussing the Court’s 
judicial authority to consider issues of restraint on personal liberty), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 613 (2006) (holding that military commissions set up by executive branch lacked power to 
proceed), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding, against Congress’s actions, that those 
held as enemy combatants must be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge their categorization as 
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when it comes to pursuing civil cases for damages resulting from 
government overreaching, plaintiffs have met with far-reaching claims of 
secrecy that courts have consistently upheld.  The cases reflect a judicial 
formalism that adheres to a very narrow view of the judicial role vis-à-vis 
security decision-making,41 to the detriment of the protection of 
fundamental rights, the rule of law, and arguably of security interests as 
well.42 
Post-9/11 state secrets privilege cases reflect a striking continuity with 
the deferential reasoning seen in Reynolds and other early Cold War 
secrecy-related cases.  For example, in September 2010, the Ninth Circuit 
en banc dismissed plaintiffs’ claims in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 
Inc.,43 a civil suit seeking damages for extraordinary rendition and torture 
conducted at the direction of the U.S. government, based on the state 
secrets privilege.44 Although the court in Jeppesen Dataplan expressed 
concern over plaintiffs’ lack of judicial remedy and the lack of government 
accountability, ultimately the government’s argument that the 
extraordinary rendition program—although publicly known—must be kept 
secret prevailed45  The majority found that dismissal of the suit was 
necessary despite the public knowledge of the program because of the 
challenges Jeppesen Dataplan would have faced in defending itself without 
access to the privileged material.46  The dissent in Jeppesen Dataplan, by 
contrast, observed that the majority had “disregard[ed] the concept of 
checks and balances” abdicated its judicial responsibility, and ignored the 
structural need to preserve a realistic avenue for plaintiffs to seek redress 
against government overreaching.47 
                                                                                                                          
such), and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that federal courts have authority to decide 
whether foreign nationals held at Guantanamo Bay were wrongfully imprisoned) reflect the Supreme 
Court’s willingness to engage in a more robust judicial role vis-à-vis security decision-making in the 
context of habeas corpus rights. 
41 See generally Sudha Setty, Judicial Formalism and the State Secrets Privilege, 38 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1629 (2012). 
42 Parks, supra note 6, at 26. 
43 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). 
44 See id. at 1073 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953)) (dismissing action 
after finding “that [state] secrets are at stake”).  The decision in Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. followed the 
reasoning, tenor, and validation of government secrecy evident in several other cases regarding 
rendition and torture.  See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the 
sensitivities surrounding “exchanges among the ministries and agencies of foreign countries on 
diplomatic, security, and intelligence issues”); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 
2007) (dismissing claims of detention and torture on grounds of state secrecy). 
45 See Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1073, 1089, 1091 (dismissing a claim for state 
secrecy, mentioning public documents tending to support claim, and discussing other possible remedies 
for plaintiff). 
46 Id. at 1090.  It is ironic that the court’s weighing of fairness ultimately resulted in dismissal 
based on concerns that a defendant that was allegedly complicit in the torture of innocent civilians 
would not be able to defend itself against a civil suit. 
47 Id. at 1101 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
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The post-9/11 judicial enabling of executive secrecy is not limited to 
the context of extraordinary rendition and torture.  The 2010 dismissal of 
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama,48 in which the plaintiff sought injunctive relief for his 
U.S. citizen son who was a subject of the CIA’s targeted killing program, 
similarly gives primacy to deferring to the executive branch and enabling 
secrecy over the substantial and troubling rule of law concerns that are 
concomitant with any targeted killing program, particularly of a country’s 
own citizens.49  Likewise, the early 2012 Fourth Circuit decision in Lebron 
v. Rumsfeld,50 upholding the dismissal of a civil damages suit based on the 
alleged abuse of U.S. citizen Jose Padilla when he was in military custody, 
turned in part on the court’s perception that it need not wait for privilege 
and secrecy issues to arise during the course of litigation, and that “the 
prospect of adverse collateral consequences” related to a breach in 
security-related secrecy counseled the court to dismiss the suit at the 
pleadings stage.51 
Compounding the problem of information access, Congress has 
consistently enabled heightened secrecy in security decision-making in the 
last decade.  Immediately following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress 
passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which cemented the government’s 
authority to determine whether information was too sensitive to disclose 
and then punish those who disclosed such information.52  Most recently, 
Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, which 
empowered the President to take extraordinary national security measures 
unilaterally, such as ordering the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens,53 
and, as an added measure, enabled further non-disclosure of information by 
the administration and military.54 
                                                                                                                          
48 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
49 Id. at 52–54 (discussing the state secrets privilege and dismissing the suit on justiciability and 
standing grounds). 
50 No. 11 6480, 2012 WL 213352 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2012). 
51 Id. at *1, *12–13 (noting that under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), special factors counseling hesitation in letting a suit go forward 
include the need for deference to the executive branch with regard to national security concerns). 
52 See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in 
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.) (disallowing the dissemination of information regarding any business 
records that are sought pursuant to terrorism investigations); id. § 223 (codified in scattered sections of 
18 U.S.C.) (permitting civil liability and administrative disciplinary measures against individuals who 
make unauthorized disclosures of information); id. § 116 (prohibiting disclosure to individuals 
involved in suspicious activities that such activity was reported pursuant to the issuance of a National 
Security Letter). 
53 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–81, §§ 1021, 1022, 
125 Stat. 1298 (2011) (authorizing indefinite military detention of U.S. citizens). 
54 Id. § 1025 (limiting the types of information, forms of communication, and representation 
available to detainees). 
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III.  THE ABILITY TO AVOID UNNECESSARY SECRECY 
Although U.S. courts and Congress, in the post-9/11 context, 
emphasize the need for government secrecy in national security,55 
consideration of other democratic nations with long-standing security 
issues reveals a variety of approaches to information-sharing among 
branches of government.  Looking at England, Israel, and India as 
comparative examples is particularly germane.  The English government’s 
approach to security-related secrecy shifted significantly during World 
War II, as did that of the United States; Israel and India are both post-
World War II democracies that have faced serious security threats since 
their founding. 
As parliamentary nations, it is of little surprise that the information 
shared between the legislative and executive branches in these nations is 
significantly higher than the information shared between a presidential 
administration and Congress in the United States.  Nonetheless, the 
willingness of the courts in England and Israel to meaningfully engage  the 
question of executive secrecy—and the refusal of Indian courts to do the 
same—is particularly helpful in providing insight into U.S. structural 
balancing. 
A.  England 
The World War II era marked a significant shift in the information-
sharing structures among the branches of government in England.  
However, even during World War II, when the Prime Minister’s foreign 
affairs responsibilities were at their highest,56 the English government 
managed to both share security-related information with the Parliament 
and maintain a high level of secrecy within Parliament to minimize the 
leak of intelligence to enemy forces.57  The decision to make the 
parliamentary sessions secret was itself open to the democratic process: the 
members of the House of Commons voted to have secret sessions in order 
to better understand the security-related decisions being made by the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, and to keep the content of such sessions as secret as 
                                                                                                                          
55 Arguably this level of deference is supported by the public as well.  See Schulhofer, supra note 
35, at 29 (arguing that “the public sides with the President and regards oversight as interference”). 
56 See Clive Parry, Legislatures and Secrecy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 737, 739 (1954) (noting that 
foreign affairs, being squarely the responsibility of the Prime Minister, “have always been conducted 
upon somewhat less democratic principles than home affairs”). 
57 Records indicate that the Prime Minister held over sixty secret sessions with Parliament related 
to the war effort during World War II.  Id. at 755.  In addition to the holding of secret sessions, the 
government used the threat of prosecution under the Official Secrets Act on Members of Parliament 
who leaked information.  See id. at 775; see also Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28, § 2 
(Eng.) (detailing the penalties for the inappropriate leaking of official and secret information). 
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possible.58  In doing so, the English government struck a very different 
balance than the United States in terms of information-sharing; although 
the public ultimately would not have access to security-related information 
due to concerns over intelligence leaking to Germany,59 some check 
existed in terms of Parliament having access to security-related 
information and the ability and obligation to question the government with 
regard to security policy. 
At the same time that the Parliament and executive were sharing 
security-related information, however, the English courts made clear that 
they would defer to government claims of the need to keep information 
secret.  The English case of Duncan v. Cammell, Laird, & Co.60 established 
the largely deferential standard for evaluating claims of secrecy under the 
public interest immunity,61 a standard that was maintained for decades after 
the end of World War II.62  In evaluating the government claim of privilege 
at issue in Duncan, the House of Lords relied on its precedent63 to hold that 
courts should defer to government claims of public interest immunity, 
noting that, “[t]hose who are responsible for the national security must be 
the sole judges of what the national security requires.”64  This deferential 
view of executive secrecy over national security decision-making prevailed 
through the turn of the twenty-first century. 
Nonetheless, in the post-9/11 context, both the English courts and 
Parliament have, to some extent, pushed back against government claims 
of the need for secrecy in national-security decision-making.65  For 
                                                                                                                          
58 See Parry, supra note 56, at 755. 
59 In 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted: “‘The reason why I asked the House to go 
into Secret Session was not because I had anything particularly secret or momentous to say.  It was 
only because there are some things which it is better for us to talk over among ourselves than when we 
are overheard by the Germans.’”  Id. at 759 (quoting WINSTON CHURCHILL, Parliament in the Air 
Raids (Sept. 17, 1940), in SECRET SESSION SPEECHES 15, 15 (Charles Eade ed., 1946)). 
60 [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  The facts of Duncan are strikingly similar to 
the U.S. Reynolds case: a British submarine sank in 1939 during sea trials, which resulted in the death 
of ninety-nine people. The families of the sailors who had been killed claimed damages from the 
builders, Cammell, Laird & Co., and sought the plans of the submarine as part of their lawsuit.  Id. at 
625–26. 
61 Public interest immunity is akin to the U.S. state secrets privilege.  See Setty, supra note 19, at 
228–29 (discussing the history of the Duncan case and the court’s holding that “courts should take an 
affidavit claiming public interest immunity at face value”). 
62 See, e.g., Air Can. v. Sec’y of State for Trade, [1983] 2 A.C. 394 (H.L.) 395 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (stating that when a government official has proffered a good faith affidavit as to the need for the 
public interest immunity to apply, the court should give absolute deference). 
63 Beatson v. Skene, [1860] 157 Eng. Rep. 1415, 1421 (holding that “if the production of a State 
paper would be injurious to the public service, the general public interest must be considered 
paramount to the individual interest of a suitor in a Court of justice”). 
64 Duncan, [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.) 641 (appeal taken from Eng.) (internal quotations omitted). 
65 Although parliamentary engagement in the question of national security-related secrecy is 
beyond the scope of this Article, it is worthwhile to note that the English parliament in the post-9/11 era 
has been deferential to the executive branch in some respects, has provided robust oversight in other 
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example, the 2008 and 2009 decisions in the case of Binyam Mohamed 
illustrate a shift in the historical deference of courts to the executive branch 
in matters of public interest immunity, potentially a sign that the English 
judiciary views access to national security information as a fundamental 
aspect of its role in checking abuses by the government.66  Binyam 
Mohamed, a plaintiff in the Jeppesen Dataplan suit in the United States,67 
had been charged by the U.S. government under the Military Commissions 
Act68 with conspiracy to commit terrorism,69 based in part on confessions 
which Mohamed alleged were elicited under the threat of torture.70  
Mohamed’s litigation in English courts sought release of evidence in the 
possession of the British government that the United States had compiled 
against Mohamed.71  Initially, Mohamed’s suit was successful, but for 
seven short paragraphs in a summary report that had been redacted after 
the Foreign Secretary issued a public interest immunity certificate claiming 
that state secrets were at issue.72 
The public interest immunity certificate asserted that the summary 
report must remain secret because, among other reasons, the U.S 
government had threatened to “re-evaluate its intelligence sharing 
relationship with the United Kingdom” and possibly withhold vital 
national security information from the United Kingdom should the 
summary be disclosed.73  The court reiterated its commitment to “open 
                                                                                                                          
contexts, and at times has used oversight to reaffirm seemingly problematic national security policies.  
See, e.g., HOME DEP’T, THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM: A REPORT BY LORD CARLILE OF BERRIEW 
Q.C. INDEPENDENT REVIEWER OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION 40–41 (2007), available at 
http://www.icj.org/IMG/UK-Carlile-DefTer.pdf (examining the appropriateness of the legal definition 
of terrorism in the United Kingdom, upholding the inclusion of glorification of terrorist activity as 
“terrorism,” but voicing some concern based on the application of this type of criminalization 
stretching back to Henry II’s execution of Priest Becket in 1164). 
66 Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aff., [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152 
(Eng.); Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aff., [2008] EWHC (Admin) 2048 
(Eng.). 
67 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010). 
68 Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aff., [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, 
[3] (Eng.) (referencing the Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948–950 (2006)). 
69 This proceeding was later dropped when the convening judge determined the prosecution could 
not proceed without the use of evidence obtained through torture.  William Glaberson, U.S. Drops War 
Crimes Charges for 5 Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at A1. 
70 Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aff., [2008] EWHC (Admin) 
2048, [38]–[40] (Eng.). 
71 Id. at [2]–[3]. 
72 Id. at [150]–[157], [160].  The court noted that the information in question was “seven very 
short paragraphs amounting to about 25 lines” of text which summarized reports by the United States 
Government to British intelligence services on the treatment of Mohamed during his detention in 
Pakistan.  Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aff., [2009] EWHC (Admin) 
152, [14] (Eng.). 
73 Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aff., [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, 
[62] (Eng.); see also Eli Lake, Obama Threatens to Limit U.S. Intel with Brits, WASH. TIMES, May 12, 
2009, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/12/obama-threatens-to-limit-us-intel-with-brits/ 
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justice, the rule of law and democratic accountability,”74 and offered 
several reasons that disclosure was desirable: upholding the rule of law,75 
comporting with international and supranational standards,76 ensuring that 
allegations of serious criminality are not dismissed inappropriately,77 
maintaining accountability over the executive branch of government,78 and 
protecting the public and media interest in disclosure of government 
activities.79  Yet ultimately the court relied heavily on its long-standing 
precedent of deference to the executive branch in matters of national 
security80 to uphold the Foreign Secretary’s issuance of the public interest 
immunity certificate.81 
However, the English court re-opened its ruling on public interest 
immunity and in October 2009 reversed its previous decision to withhold 
the information regarding Mohamed’s treatment by the U.S. government,82 
noting that “a vital public interest requires, for reasons of democratic 
accountability and the rule of law in the United Kingdom, that a summary 
of the most important evidence relating to the . . . British security services 
in wrongdoing be placed in the public domain in the United Kingdom.”83 
The October 2009 decision in the Mohamed case84 reflects a 
willingness by the English courts to engage in substantial questioning of 
the need for secrecy in at least some national security matters, but it also 
has created significant judicial-political tensions.  In late 2011, the British 
government proposed that Parliament, which has exercised a significant 
                                                                                                                          
(discussing May 6, 2009 letter from the Obama administration reiterating its position that disclosure of 
information in question—even if made unilaterally by English courts over the objection of Her 
Majesty’s Government—would likely lead to the withholding of valuable counterterrorism information 
from the United Kingdom). 
74 Id. at [18] (noting that this case revolved around a question of the rule of law, not around the 
rights of an individual litigant). 
75 Id. at [18]–[19]. 
76 Id. at [20], [21], [26], [101]–[105]. 
77 Id. at [26(iv)], [26(ix)]. 
78 Id. at [32]. 
79 See id. at [37] (“Where there is no publicity there is no justice. . . . There is no greater danger of 
usurpation than that which proceeds little by little, under cover of rules of procedure, and at the 
instance of judges themselves.”). 
80 See id. at [63]–[67].  However, the court noted that such deference needed to be limited to 
instances of genuine national security, and not cases in which “it appears that while disclosure of the 
material may cause embarrassment or arouse criticism, it will not damage any security or intelligence 
interest.”  Id. at [66]. 
81 Id. at [79]. 
82 See id. at [7] (noting that reopening of a case should be done in “exceptional circumstances” if 
necessary in the “interests of justice”). 
83 Id. at [105]. 
84 In February 2010, the Court of Appeal upheld the divisional court’s decision.  Mohamed v. 
Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 65, [2011] Q.B. 218 
(Eng.). 
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amount of oversight authority in various security matters,85 strip judicial 
review over cases similar to Mohamed, in which sensitive information may 
be disclosed.86  In doing so, the British government is demonstrating its 
clear distaste for the type of oversight that the judiciary exercised in 
Mohamed.  As of this writing, it remains unclear whether the parliament or 
the courts will acquiesce to the government’s request that it be granted 
even greater rights to keep information away from other branches of 
government and the public, despite rule of law and open justice concerns.87  
Given that the question of access to information is directly related to the 
outcomes of individual trials and implicates sensitive foreign relations 
questions, the government has been applying significant pressure on the 
judiciary and parliament to acquiesce in this matter.88 
B.  Israel 
Two Israeli cases are particularly useful in addressing secrecy-related 
decision-making in the comparative context.  In Public Committee Against 
Torture v. Israel,89 the central issue was the legality under domestic and 
international law of preventative strikes undertaken by the Israeli military 
in response to the fear of terrorist attacks.  The court first dealt with the 
                                                                                                                          
85 See Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name?  How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years After 9/11, 33 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 41–45 (2011) (taking note of parliamentary oversight with regard to some security-
related decisions, such as establishing the legal definition of terrorism). 
86 See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER 36 ¶ 2.91 
(2011).  The Green Paper notes that such measures are necessary because “[s]ince Binyam Mohamed, 
the Government and its foreign government partners have less confidence than before that the courts 
will accept the view of Ministers on the harm to national security that would result from disclosure.”  
Id. at 14 ¶ 1.43. 
87 See ADAM TOMKINS & TOM HICKMAN, BINGHAM CENTRE FOR THE RULE OF LAW, RESPONSE 
TO THE JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER 22–24 (2012), available at 
http://www.biicl.org/files/5829_bingham_centre_response_to_green_paper.pdf (arguing that the Green 
Paper’s proposal to strip judicial review of such cases is based on misconceptions, is unjustified and 
would undermine the rule of law); UNITED KINGDOM HOUSE OF LORDS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, TWENTY-FOURTH REPORT, JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER 32–33 2012), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/apr/uk-jhrc-green-paper-security.pdf (emphasizing the 
importance of the judicial role in determining access to information and weighing government claims 
of the need for secrecy). 
88 See Patrick Wintour & Ian Cobain, David Cameron Defends Secret Court Hearings and 
Surveillance Proposals, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 4, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/apr/04/david-cameron-secret-courts-surveillance (quoting Prime 
Minister David Cameron and Justice Minister Ken Clarke as defending the green paper’s proposals.  
Clarke claimed that the United States had already curtailed the information shared with the United 
Kingdom, noting “I can’t force the Americans to give our intelligence people full cooperation—if they 
fear our courts, they won’t give us the material.  Sometimes national security demands that you have to 
give a guarantee of complete confidentiality to third party countries—and not just the Americans.”). 
89 HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture v. Israel 2 ISR. L. REP. 459, 470–471, 475–77, 509–
10 [2006] (Isr.). 
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threshold question of justiciability based on national security concerns,90 
much like the U.S. district court in the al-Aulaqi case. 
The Israeli Supreme Court considered the broad Israeli justiciability 
doctrine that encouraged the justiciability of claims involving human 
rights,91 and undertook a proportionality analysis to find that the plaintiff’s 
suit could go forward.92  Ultimately, the court concluded that the targeted 
killings at issue in the case were not per se illegal, but that they should be 
evaluated by courts on a case-by-case basis, with the court reviewing 
evidence in camera as necessary to deal with security concerns.93 
In another case, Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in 
Israel v. Minister of the Interior,94 the court explained the imperative of 
open government that enables the judiciary to access information to make 
informed decisions as to the appropriate level of deference with regard to 
security decision-making: 
The “security need” argument made by the state has no 
magical power such that once raised it must be accepted 
without inquiry and investigation. . . . Admittedly, as a 
rule, the court is cautious in examining the security 
considerations of the authorities and it does not intervene 
in them lightly.  Notwithstanding, where the 
implementation of a security policy involves a violation of 
human rights, the court should examine the reasonableness 
of the considerations of the authorities and the 
proportionality of the measures that they wish to 
implement.95 
The Israeli Supreme Court uses an approach focused on reasonableness 
and proportionality to determine the appropriate level of deference in 
                                                                                                                          
90 Id. at 470 (discussing how the government, in arguing against justiciability, cited Israeli High 
Court of Justice precedent, HCJ 5872/01 Barakeh v. Prime Minister 1 [2002], for the proposition that 
“the choice of the method of combat that [the government] employ[ed] in order to prevent murderous 
terrorist attacks before they are committed is not one of the subjects in which this court will see fit to 
intervene”). 
91 The Court considered two strands of Israeli justiciability doctrine—normative and institutional.  
For a fuller discussion, see Setty, supra note 19, at 246. 
92 HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture v. Israel 2 ISR. L. REP. 459, 464–65 [2006] (Isr.). 
93 Id. at 521–23.  This decision is particularly notable given the recent decision dismissing a suit 
challenging the U.S. targeted killing program.  See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2010) (dismissing, based on standing grounds, the suit of Nasser al-Aulaqi to enjoin the U.S. 
government from keeping his son, U.S. citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi, on its targeted killing list). 
94 HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior 1 
ISR. L. REP. 443, 445 [2006] (Isr.) (holding that the Citizenship and Entry into Israel law, barring 
reunification of some Palestinian families, did not violate the Human Dignity and Liberty Clause of the 
Basic Law, based on the perceived security interests of Israel). 
95 Id. at 692–93 (internal citations omitted). 
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security-related cases.  In order to undertake such an approach, it has 
created a legal culture that disallows blanket claims of secrecy and enables 
the courts to engage fully in the judicial review process.96  Although the 
extent to which this procedural fairness inures to the substantive benefit of 
individual plaintiffs appears to be limited, since the courts largely affirm 
the actions of the military and the government,97 the access to information 
afforded by the Israeli courts has significant structural value in allowing 
suits to proceed and attempting to establish a baseline of process for those 
affected by the national security state. 
C.  India 
In many respects, India provides a counterexample to England and 
Israel in terms of the willingness of courts to question executive secrecy 
claims.  Historically, Indian courts have granted the utmost deference to 
the executive branch as to when government information,98 particularly in 
the area of national security, need be disclosed.99  The Supreme Court of 
India made clear almost forty years ago, in Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain,100 
that national security is the primary area in which the Prime Minister can 
unilaterally decide what information to disclose and that the role of the 
courts in questioning those decisions was extremely limited.101  The 
judiciary’s rhetoric highlights the need for government accountability and 
transparency,102 but courts consistently defer to executive branch claims of 
                                                                                                                          
96 The Israeli government and military appear to accept the robust judicial review that forces 
disclosure of policy and sometimes results in significant changes in the conduct of the administration.  
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and Israeli 
Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1931 (2004) (“Israeli courts have put in place a strong, 
increasingly robust system of judicial checks.”). 
97 See, e.g., HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, 57(2) PD 
349 [2002] (Isr.). 
98 Weaver & Pallitto offer an early colonial-era counterexample in which the court insisted that 
justice and humanity required that the books of the Council to the East India Company be produced as 
part of a criminal prosecution, despite government claims of state secrets being at issue.  Weaver & 
Pallitto, supra note 19, at 97. 
99 See Mrinal Satish & Aparna Chandra, Of Maternal State and Minimalist Judiciary: The Indian 
Supreme Court’s Approach to Terror-Related Adjudication, 21 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 51, 65 
(2009) (describing the history of Indian courts deferring to executive decisions regarding security 
matters). 
100 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, (1975) 3 S.C.R. 333 (India). 
101 Id. (upholding government decisions to keep national security information secret). 
102 This deference has been consistent despite the adoption of the right to information legislation 
in recent years and judicial statements about the importance of government transparency.  The Freedom 
of Information Act, No. 5 of 2003, INDIA CODE (2009); see also, e.g., S.P. Gupta v. President of India, 
(1982) 2 S.C.R. 365 (India) (“The concept of an open government is the direct emanation from the 
right to know which seems to be implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under 
Article 19 (1)(a) [of the Indian Constitution].  Therefore, disclosure of information in regard to the 
functioning of Government must be the rule and secrecy an exception justified only where the strictest 
requirement of public interest so demands.”); Country Passing Through Transparency Revolution: 
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secrecy in the name of public interest.103  Further, the courts allow for 
active enforcement of the Official Secrets Act, a legacy of British colonial 
rule in India,104 to investigate and punish disclosure of sensitive 
information. 
This pattern of acknowledging the policy and rule of law concerns 
surrounding secrecy, but ultimately siding with the government’s position 
with little investigation into the need for secrecy or the veracity of the 
government’s claims, has played out in a variety of secrecy-related cases.  
For example, in the 2004 case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. 
Union of India,105 the court upheld the government’s secrecy claim over a 
report on nuclear reactors, reasoning that secrecy was sometimes necessary 
because “[i]f every action taken by the political or executive functionary is 
transformed into a public controversy and made subject to an enquiry to 
soothe popular sentiments, it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on the 
independence of the decision-maker.”106  The court couched its long-
standing deference and the need for secrecy in terms of maintaining 
consistency with the English public interest immunity doctrine.107 
The court’s enabling of government secrecy in the national security 
context is largely a response to public pressure on the Indian government 
to take whatever steps are necessary and available to safeguard national 
security,108 a dynamic that has led to the hasty passage of counterterrorism 
laws that further enable government secrecy.109  The reticence of the courts 
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to demand security-related information from the government may also be a 
product of the judiciary’s conceptual understanding of its constitutional 
role as one which exercises a robust judicial review with regard to most 
social justice and individual rights cases, but not with regard to security-
related issues.110 
Whether judicial deference is constitutionally based, responsive to 
public pressure, or otherwise, the end result is the conscious and consistent 
practice of allowing government invocations of secrecy to go unchecked, 
regardless of the effect on curbing government abuse or preserving an 
avenue of redress for individual litigants or upholding the rule of law more 
generally.  In some respects, the Indian example serves to illustrate the 
significance of the ability to gain access to the courts in Israel: even if the 
plaintiff is unlikely to prevail there, the plaintiff is still able to access the 
courts for a public airing of the grievances being alleged. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Professor Rana has urged a reconsideration of the position that the 
executive and military are best positioned to make decisions about national 
security issues.  This Article argues that this centralization of security 
decision-making power, particularly in the early Cold War era, has fostered 
a culture of secrecy that has been enabled by Congress and the judiciary 
despite their structural obligations to provide oversight.  The ongoing 
harms to the rule of law and to individual litigants are reason enough to 
rethink the current extraordinary deference afforded the executive branch, 
and it is worthwhile to recall that Congress has previously observed that, 
“secrecy comes at a price.  That price includes undermining the legitimacy 
of government actions, reducing accountability, hindering critical 
technological and scientific progress, interfering with the efficiency of the 
marketplace, and breeding paranoia.”111  Other democratic nations facing 
severe security threats have found a more just and humane balance 
between the legitimate need for secrecy and the fundamental imperative to 
access information concerning actions taken in the name of our national 
security; our own democratic principles demand that we do the same. 
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